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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A police officer approached Mr. Loosli, requested identification, and retained the
identification-all without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The police
officer observed Mr. Loosli throw an object and a search of the scene uncovered a pipe.
Thereafter, Mr. Loosli was arrested.

The State charged Mr. Loosli with possession of

paraphernalia and destruction of evidence.
Mr. Loosli moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his unlawful seizure, including
the paraphernalia and incriminating statements.

The magistrate court denied the motion to

suppress. On appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate court's order denying the motion
to suppress. The State now appeals from the district court's decision.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 9, 2018, during the early evening, Officer Robert Rodriguez was patrolling in a
marked police vehicle in Meridian, Idaho. (Tr., p. 14, 1. 21-25; Tr., p. 15, 1. 1-13). Officer
Rodriguez observed Mr. Loosli riding a bicycle down an alleyway. (Tr., p. 15, 1. 24-25; Tr., p.
16, 1. 1-3). Officer Rodriguez, wearing full uniform, stopped his marked patrol vehicle on the
side street at the end of the alleyway and next to the railroad tracks, exited the vehicle, and
approached Mr. Loosli. (Tr., p. 5, 1. 20-25; Tr., p. 6, 1. 1-4; State's Ex. 1, 0:23-0:37). He then
called out to Mr. Loosli and asked, "hey buddy, how you doing?" (State's Ex. 1, 0:33-0:40).
Mr. Loosli asked whether he was being stopped for coasting down the alleyway. (State's Ex. 1,
0:40). Nobody else was present at the scene during this time. (State's Ex. 1, 0:23-58).
Officer Rodriguez then asked Mr. Loosli for identification. (Tr., p. 6, 1. 4). While Mr.
Loosli was retrieving his identification, Officer Rodriguez asked whether Mr. Loosli was on
probation or parole. [State's Ex. 1: 11-1: 17]. Mr. Loosli then handed over his driver's license.
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(Tr., p. 6, l. 12–14). Upon reviewing Mr. Loosli’s driver’s license, Officer Rodriguez recognized
the listed address as a known location for drug activity. (Tr., p. 18, l. 13–20). Officer Rodriguez
then conducted a patdown search of Mr. Loosli. (State’s Ex. 1, 2:28–3:05).
Officer Rodriguez ordered Mr. Loosli to take his hands out of his pockets, then observed
Mr. Loosli throw an object away towards the railroad tracks. (State’s Ex. 1, 2:56–3:07). A
search of the area revealed a pipe, and Officer Rodriguez placed Mr. Loosli under arrest.
(State’s Ex. 1, 3:09–3:15). The State ultimately charged Mr. Loosli with Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, Idaho Code § 37-2734A(1), and Destruction, Alternation, or Concealment of
Evidence, Idaho Code § 18-2603. (R., pp. 2, 9).
Based on his unlawful seizure, Mr. Loosli filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence
obtained as a result of the unlawful seizure, including the paraphernalia and incriminating
statements. (R., pp. 13–18). At a hearing on the matter, Mr. Loosli took the stand and testified
that he did not feel free to leave while Officer Rodriguez was holding onto his identification.
(Tr., p. 6, l. 12–17). Officer Rodriguez testified that he did not suspect Mr. Loosli was engaged
in criminal activity, nor did he suspect that Mr. Loosli had any outstanding warrants. (Tr., p. 23,
l. 11–21).
After hearing the evidence and argument, the magistrate court denied the motion to
suppress. (Tr., p. 30, l. 22–24; Tr., p. 31, l. 1–5). The magistrate court reasoned that the
encounter between Officer Rodriguez and Mr. Loosli was consensual. (Tr., p. 30, l. 22–25; Tr.,
p. 31, l. 1–15).
Mr. Loosli then entered a conditional plea of guilty to Possession of Drug Paraphernalia,
and the State dismissed the Destruction, Alteration, or Concealment of Evidence charge. (R., p.
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42–43).

Mr. Loosli subsequently appealed from his Judgment of Conviction, arguing the

magistrate court erred in denying his motion to suppress. (R., p. 60–69).
On appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate court. (R., p., 119–128). The district
court specifically held that Mr. Loosli’s identification “was obtained and held for no apparent
reason except curiosity and fishing for leads to something that is unidentified in the record.” (R.,
p. 127). Moreover, the district court ruled that “politeness and phrasing should not diminish the
right to be left alone except for an articulable reason. The license was requested and held for no
articulated reason. No reasonable person would feel free to ride away leaving that document
behind…Once the license was taken for no apparent reason the defendant was seized.” Id. The
State appeals from the district court’s decision.
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ISSUE
I.

Whether the

district court erred in

holding that Mr. Loosli was unlawfully seized and

reversing the magistrate court’s order denying Mr. Loosli’s motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The

District Court Correctly

Reversed the Magistrate Court’s Order Denying Mr. Loosli’s

Motion
A.

Introduction

The
motion

to Suppress.

district court correctly

t0 suppress.

reversed the magistrate court’s order denying Mr. Loosli’s

Mr. Loosli was unlawfully seized When Ofﬁcer Rodriguez requested and

obtained his driver’s license Without any reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Moreover, the

totality

0f circumstances demonstrates the encounter between Mr. Loosli and

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez was nonconsensual.
B.

Standard of Review

When

reviewing a decision rendered by a

district

court sitting in

its

intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly reviews the district court’s decision.”

State

v.

Chernobieﬁ’, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (quoting In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243,

248, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009)).
the appellate court Will

If the district court properly applied the

afﬁrm the

district court’s decision.

State

v.

law to the

facts,

then

Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 725,

339 P.3d 1126, 1129 (2014).

The standard of review

for a

motion

t0 suppress is bifurcated.

Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000).

State

The reviewing court accepts

v.

Holland, 135

the trial court’s

ﬁndings of facts that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f
the constitutional principles t0 the facts as found. Id.

C.

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez unlawfully seized Mr. Loosli bV Retaining Mr. Loosli’s Driver’s
License Without a Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion 0f Criminal Activity.

When Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

seized Mr. Loosli Without a reasonable, articulable suspicion 0f

criminal activity, he violated Mr. Loosli’s Fourth

Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment t0
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the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
house, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to apply to the states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 654-55 (1961).

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “impose a standard of

reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
While not all encounters between police officers and citizens amount to seizures, a court
may conclude that a seizure has occurred when an officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16
(1968).

In determining whether a seizure has taken place, “a court must consider all the

circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
When an officer detains an individual “for the purpose of requiring him to identify
himself,” a seizure occurs. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). In Brown, an officer
stopped an individual solely to “ascertain his identity.” Id. at 52. Because the record was void
of any indication that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the
United States Supreme Court held that the officer’s conduct amounted to an unlawful seizure.
Id. at 52-53.
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In Idaho, the appellate courts have consistently held that the retention of a driver’s license
amounts to a detention. See, e.g., State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663
(2017) (ruling that the retention of a driver’s license amounts to a seizure); State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) (“This Court has previously held that a limited
detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork of value”);
State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 707, 169 P.3d 291, 295 (Ct. App. 2007) (“We agree with
the district court’s ruling that the officer seized Zapata-Reyes because a seizure occurs when an
officer secures the driver’s license and runs his or her name through dispatch to check for
outstanding warrants”). Notably, in both Page and Cohagan, officers merely asked (and did not
command) to see identification, and in both cases the Idaho Supreme Court ruled this conduct
amounted to an unlawful seizure. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721, 404 P.3d at 663; Page, 140 Idaho
at 845, 103 P.3d at 458.
Here, too, when Officer Rodriguez asked for and retained Mr. Loosli’s driver’s license, a
seizure occurred. Obviously Officer Rodriguez had no other intention to observe the driver’s
license aside from investigating the information on Mr. Loosli’s driver’s license, and at this
point, there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion for this detention. Officer Rodriguez
testified as much.
In fact, there was no legitimate reason for Officer Rodriguez to seize Mr. Loosli’s
identification. If an officer has a legitimate reason to make contact with an individual, even
though that reason may not have amounted to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, that legitimate reason for contact may justify a request for identification. State v.
Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 991, 88 P.3d 1226, 1231 (2004). In Landreth, a store employee
reported suspicious circumstances regarding a car in the parking lot. Id. Upon arrival at the
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scene, an officer observed an extension cord running from the car to the grocery store, which he
thought was unusual. Id. The officer approached the individual sitting inside the parked car and
requested identification. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the request for identification did not
amount to a seizure because the officer had a legitimate reason to make contact with the
individual. Id. But the Court cautioned that its decision “does not countenance officers initiating
‘consensual contacts’ with individuals merely in order to follow that contact with a request for
identification…Such a law enforcement tactic would run afoul of the Supreme Court decision in
Brown.” Landreth, 139 Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at 1231. In the present case, there was no
legitimate reason for Officer Rodriguez to approach Mr. Loosli, request identification, and retain
his driver’s license. This encounter, masked as a consensual contact, indeed runs afoul of
Brown.
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressed concern “about the implications
of a rule allowing law enforcement officers the ability to initiate consensual encounters with
pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a warrants check.” Page, 140 Idaho at 845,
103 P.3d at 458. In Page, a police officer on patrol observed Page walking down the middle of
a road carrying some bags late at night. Page, 140 Idaho at 842, 103 P.3d at 455. The police
officer stopped his marked patrol vehicle behind Page, exited the vehicle, and approached Page
to ask about Page’s well-being. Id. at 842-43, 103 P.3d at 455-56. At this point, the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded that the encounter between Page and the police officer was consensual
and that the police officer was acting within his community caretaker function. Id. at 844, 103
P.3d at 457. The police officer then asked Page for identification, took the license back to his
patrol vehicle, and ran Page’s name through dispatch. Id. at 843, 103 P.3d at 456. This conduct,
the Court ruled, amounted to an unlawful seizure because “[t]his Court has previously held that a
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limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork of
value.” Id. at 844, 103 P.3d at 457. Thus, without “a compelling need to seize identification,”
the encounter transformed from a lawful encounter under the police officer’s community
caretaking function to an unlawful seizure. Id. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458. The Court in Page
indicated that “the United States Supreme Court made clear the general rule that in the absence
of any basis for suspecting an individual of misconduct, the Fourth Amendment generally does
not allow governmental agents to detain an individual and demand identification.” Id. (citing
Brown, 443 U.S. 47).
To reiterate, in Page, the Court acknowledged that the officer asked for identification.
Page, 140 Idaho at 843, 103 P.3d at 456. This is important because here, too, Officer Rodriguez
asked Mr. Loosli for identification. But as the district court noted, “politeness and phrasing
should not diminish the right to be left alone except for an articulable reason.” [R., p. 127]. The
district court further noted, “a decision should not depend on the syntax of the officer—that is,
asking or telling, “May I see your license?” “Let me see your license.” [R., p. 127].
Even more recently, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]oday’s decision should
remove any lingering doubt as to whether this Court will sanction the unjustified, suspicionless
seizure of citizens.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 726, 404 P.3d at 668. In Cohagan, two police
officers observed Cohagan standing on a street corner. Id. at 719, 404 P.3d at 661. The senior
police officer thought that Cohagan resembled another individual with an outstanding warrant.
Id. The junior police officer approached Cohagan and asked for identification, then confirmed
that Cohagan was not the other individual with the warrant. Id. Nevertheless, the senior officer
wanted to confirm Cohagan’s identification so he then asked for Cohagan’s identification,
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retained the identiﬁcation, and ran Cohagan’s

name through

dispatch t0 run a warrants check.

Id.

The Court

in

Cohagan ruled

that “there

Cohagan and run a warrant check,” and

was simply n0 reason

at

666

and

(internal quotations

need for the police ofﬁcer
purposeful conduct

Fourth

Amendment

citations omitted).

t0 seize

simply untenable and

is

designed t0 protected against.”
clear that

is

precisely the type 0f encounter that both

it

away

that “[s]uch

exactly the type 0f ﬂagrantly unlawful conduct the

Id.

was an unjustiﬁed,

suspicionless seizure.

Ofﬁcer

This encounter

Page and Cohagan admonish.1 And

the district court

for

n0

articulable reason.

No

is

unidentiﬁed in the record. .The license
.

reasonable person would feel free to ride

leaving that document behind.” [R., p. 127].
Indeed, the totality of circumstances here demonstrates that no reasonable person

have

is

held that “the license was obtained and held for n0 apparent reason

except curiosity and ﬁshing for leads t0 something that

was requested and held

724, 404 P.3d

The Court held

Rodriguez had no compelling need t0 seize Mr. Loosli’s drievr’s license.

When

Id. at

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s encounter with Mr. Loosli and the

retention 0f Mr. Loosli’s driver’s license

recognized this

t0 stop

Thus, like in Page, there was no compelling

is

Here, the record

would turn up.”

Cohagan’s identiﬁcation.
is

Ofﬁcer Curtis

conduct was “nothing more than a

that this exact

suspicionless ﬁshing expedition in the hope that something

for

felt free to

leave the scene.

would

Mr. Loosli was riding 0n a bicycle when Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

parked his marked patrol vehicle 0n the side

street (partially

0n the side of the road,

partially

still

1

Mr. Loosli acknowledges that in both State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 7 17, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017) and State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004), the ofﬁcers asked for identiﬁcation and then ran warrants
checks While holding onto the identiﬁcation. While Ofﬁcer Rodriguez did not run a warrants check while holding
onto Mr. Loosli’s driver’s license, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez did not even get to this point because his suspicions were
already raised
activity.

(TL,

When he “immediately
p. 18,

1.

13-20).

was a known location for drug
even more problematic that the situations in Cohagan and Page
run a warrants check during his investigative detention and seizure.

noticed” that the address on the driver’s license

Thus, this case

because Ofﬁcer Rodriguez did not even need t0

is
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on the road), exited the patrol vehicle while wearing full uniform, approached Mr. Loosli, and
called out to Mr. Loosli. Such conduct exhibited a show of authority. And notably, nobody else
was present at this time. Mr. Loosli asked if he was being stopped for coasting down the
alleyway, and Officer Rodriguez requested identification. As Mr. Loosli was retrieving his
identification, Officer Rodriguez asked whether he was on probation or parole.

Officer

Rodriguez then held onto Mr. Loosli’s identification for almost a minute and during this time,
asked whether he could write down Mr. Loosli’s information. As the district court noted, “no
wise or prudent person would bicycle away leaving his license behind…no reasonable person
would feel free to ride away leaving that document behind.” [R., p. 127]. Clearly, no reasonable
person would terminate an encounter while a law enforcement officer is holding on that person’s
driver’s license. The retention of the driver’s license restrained Mr. Loosli’s liberty, and Officer
Rodriguez’s conduct exhibited a show of authority—therefore, a seizure occurred. Mr. Loosli
testified that he did not feel free to leave, and no reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
The State maintains otherwise and relies primarily on federal case law to support its
position. But the State’s reliance is misplaced. First, the State misapplies U.S. v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980). In that case, DEA agents in an airport observed the defendant engage in
suspicious conduct that was “characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics.” Id. at 547.
The agents were not wearing uniforms or displaying weapons. Id. at 555. They approached the
defendant and asked to see her identification, and ultimately searched the defendant and
discovered heroin. Id. at 548-49. The defendant moved to suppress the heroin, arguing that the
seizure and search was unlawful. Id. at 547. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that that in view of all the facts, including that the events took place in a public concourse in an
airport and the agents did not wear uniforms, a seizure did not occur when the agents approached
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the defendant and requested identification. Id. at 555. That case is distinguishable from the
present case, in which a police officer in full uniform stepped out of a marked patrol vehicle near
an alleyway with nobody else present, approached Mr. Loosli, and requested identification.
Moreover, the defendant in Mendenhall had engaged in suspicious conduct before DEA agents
requested identification, whereas Officer Rodriguez testified that he did not suspect Mr. Loosli to
be engaged in criminal activity prior to requesting identification.
The State also misapplies I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) and U.S. v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194 (2002). In those cases, the government seized entire groups of people. Delgado,
466 U.S. at 212 (posing questions to employees within a factory regarding their immigration
status); Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–98 (asking questions to bus passengers regarding travel plans).
Those cases are distinguishable from the present case. In Delgado, no one individual was
singled out and subjected to questioning or demands for identification. Delgado, 466 U.S. at
212. Rather, the INS broadly focused on an entire factory of employees that were free to move
around their workplace. Id. at 218. And in Drayton, the Court held there was no seizure because
there was no show of authority and “many fellow passengers [were] present to witness officers’
conduct,” thereby making a reasonable person feel “even more secure in his or her decision not
to cooperate with police on a bus than in other circumstances.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204.
Here, Officer Rodriguez singled out Mr. Loosli at the end of an alleyway, parked his
marked patrol car to somewhat block Mr. Loosli’s path, walked towards Mr. Loosli in full
uniform, and called out to Mr. Loosli. Mr. Loosli was blatantly the sole target of Officer
Rodriguez’s interaction—nobody else was present.

And once Mr. Loosli handed over his

identification, he was clearly not free to leave the scene—no reasonable person would feel free to
leave without their valuable documents (and to leave behind those valuable documents with a
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police ofﬁcer).

For these reasons, the State’s reliance 0n Mendenhall, Delgado, and Drayton

is

unhelpful.

In sum, Without the presence 0f a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity,

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez violated Mr. Loosli’s constitutional

t0 a suspicionless

genuine

or

warranted

Accordingly, the

ﬁshing expedition.

It is

concern t0 justify the

all

Loosli, asking

undisputed that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez had no

seizure

of Mr.

Loosli’s

driver’s

license.

reversed the magistrate court’s order denying Mr.

district court correctly

Loosli’s motion t0 suppress

by approaching Mr.

and reviewing the identiﬁcation—all of Which

for identiﬁcation, retaining the identiﬁcation,

amounts

rights

evidence as a result of that unlawful seizure.

CONCLUSION
Because Ofﬁcer Rodriguez unlawfully seized Mr. Loosli, Mr. Loosli respectﬁllly
requests that this Court

afﬁrm the

district court’s

decision reversing the magistrate court’s order

denying Mr. Loosli’s motion t0 suppress.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2019,

w

94M”

A. H. Howell
Attorney for Defendant

:Iessica
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